In the first section of The Language of New Media, Lev Manovich defines how computer media differs from previous forms. He sets out five principles to explain the difference: numerical representation, modularity, automation, variability, and transcoding. The first two principles comprise a sort of “material” upon which the second two principles—which actually influence behavior—can occur. Ie, the programmability and modularity of new media allows for the automated creation and retrieval of content, as well as a certain decentralization in how people are enabled to access (or create) that content.
Taken as a whole, Manovich argues that the first four principles of new media enable a radical transformation in culture. Rather than receiving a pre-packaged narrative from the mass media, the particulars of new media allows “every citizen [to] construct her own custom lifestyle and ‘select’ her ideology from a large (but not infinite) number of choices” (42). In turn, the choices allowed of people are beginning to follow Manovich’s fifth principle of transcoding: “the result of [the computer-cultural] composite is a new computer culture—a blend of human and computer meanings, of traditional ways in which human culture modeled the world and the computer’s own means of representing it” (46). In other words, culture—at the level of “ontology, epistemology, and pragmatics” (47)—is being altered by and altering digitization.
Having read the first section of Manovich’s work, I honestly have to say that I feel a somewhat profound need to catch my breath. I like Manovich—he seems credible, his points are well-argued, and his argument for the history behind new media is compelling. I’m nonetheless trying to figure out why I suddenly agree that LOLCats
constitute a fundamental and revolutionary shift in our epistemology. *Sigh*. But they seem to. Our culture has grown used to creating, manipulating, morphing, and mashing media to an extent that it almost seems natural. Nonetheless, Manovich’s comparison of new media to the hegemonic media of previous eras shows how radically our relationship toward power-knowledge has really changed. In contrast to a system that disseminated “the same texts, images, and sounds to millions of citizens—thus assuring the same ideological beliefs” the new system seems to favor the free exercise of ideology and power, even at the margins. The industrial paradigm is out, and the post-industrial paradigm is in.
I was somewhat confused by the tension between this atomized exercise of power in new media, and Manovich’s definitions of “what new media is not.” Though I have yet to work through my questions about this text, I honestly think its’ qualifications helped to cement its’ credibility. Toward the end of the chapter, Manovich argues that the modern desire to “externalize the mind… can be related to the demand of modern mass society for standardization… the private and the individual are translated into the public and become regulated” (60). He goes on to state that “interactive media ask us to identify with someone else’s mental structure… to follow the mental trajectory of the new media designer” (61). In other words, I understood that Manovich’s argument is not unqualifiedly utopian: that some mechanism for control (disciplinarity?) exists at the heart of new media, enabling but also curtailing the unfettered use of discourse. This point sounds about right, but am I misreading it?
Nicely done! Your post helped me better understand just what kind of impact post-industrial logic has had on culture. I keep being troubled, though, by the comment that Tyler also referred to on 42 about how "new media objects assure users that their choices--and therefore, their underlying thoughts and desires--are unique." But isn't his point that even within the logic of new media they are not unique? If everyone is unique--if culture and identity are produced on demand--then aren't we back to being all the same?
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